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ALI's RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
CONSUMER CONTRACTS:
PERPETUATING A LEGAL FICTION?
By Dee Pridgen*

ABSTRACT
The American La w Institute'sproposedRestatement of the
Law of Consumer Contracts has undergone a lengthy process of
drafts and discussions, but the road to completion has been rocky.
Indeed, only one of nine proposed sections have thus far been
adopted by the ALImembership, despite years of work on the project. Much of the criticism centered on the proposal'sdefinition of
consumerassent to (oradoption of) standardcontractterms, which
as currently drafted states that consumers are bound by contract
terms of which theyhave hadnotice and an opportunity to review,
and have manifested assent in some reasonableform. This principle would apply regardlessof the fact that almost no consumers
reador understandstandardcontract terms beyond the core terms
of the transaction, especially when the terms are part of online
commerce. This modelperpetuatesa "legalfiction" that would allow judges to assume assent even though such assent is neitherinformed nor meaningful. The Reportersproffer the defenses of unconscionabilityand deception to protect consumers from business
overreach, but this approachputs an undue burden on consumers
who put their faith in the law to protect them from unfair or deceptive contract clauses. At this point, the ALI should either terminate the project, reframe the project to something other than a
restatement, or make some major amendments to the section on
adoptions of standardterms, as suggested in this article.

* Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND

OVERVIEW

The members of the American Law Institute (ALI)' are currently considering what may ultimately become "The Restatement
of the Law of Consumer Contracts." 2 This project could provide
an opportunity for real law reform. Indeed, the original goals of
the ALI include adapting the law to social needs and improving
the administration of justice as well as reflecting the law as it
stands. The current Director of the ALI, Richard Revesz, recently
noted that from the ALI's outset in 1923, the Restatements were
never meant to be mere summaries of existing law but should also
seek to promote changes in the law that would improve its relevance to changing societal needs.3 Restatements are meant to be
"analytical, critical and constructive."4 Despite these lofty goals,
however, many critics fear that the latest version of the Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts will simply perpetuate
outmoded common law doctrines, at least as they affect consumer
contracts. This article will attempt to both document the issues
with the draft Restatement's position as well as to suggest a different path.
The author has been a member of the advisory committee
to the proposed Restatement of Consumer Contracts project since
its inception in 2012.

The Tentative Draft of the proposed

The Story ofAL, AM. LAW INST. (2020), www.ali.org/about-ali/story-line/.
(The American Law Institute was founded in 1923 by a group of prominent
judges, lawyers and law professors "to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific
legal work." The organization is limited to 3,000 members who are elected based
on professional achievement and demonstrated interest in improving the law.
The ALI is best known for its "restatements" of the common law, which are now
in the third series. The ALI is not a legislature, but functions as a highly regarded advisory body).
1

2

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACTS

(AM.

LAW INST., Tentative

Draft, 2019) [hereafter TD] (submitted to ALI members for discussion at the
Annual Meeting held May 21, 2019). Note that this would be a supplemental
Restatement separate from the existing Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
which already exists.
3 Richard L. Revesz, The Debate Over the Role of Restatements, THE ALI
REPORTER, Summer 2019, at 1.
4 AM. LAW INST., HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO

REVIEW THEIR WORK (1st ed. 2005, rev. 2015).
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Restatement was put before the general membership of the ALI for
a vote in May of 2019, but no conclusion was reached.' Thus the
proposed Restatement, as of this writing, is not yet an official final
document of the ALI. There is still time to reshape it, modify it or
terminate it. It contains nine sections and has already been
through multiple iterations. This article will focus mainly on Section Two, Adoption of Standard Contract Terms, and secondarily
on Sections 5 and 6, on Unconscionability and Deception.
The ALI Restatements of Law are generally aimed at summarizing and sometimes shaping common law doctrines whereas
much of consumer law is governed by statutes and regulations.
There is at least one area where the common law of contracts is
having a big impact on consumer contracts, however, and that is
the application of the so-called "duty to read" doctrine to bind consumers to online standard form contracts. One-sided and unfair
clauses are increasingly showing up in a scroll down box, a clickable multi-page hyperlink, or even in the shipping container or on a

hyperlink that is only accessible after the purchase has been made.
The switch from paper to online contracts for consumer sales has
made it easier for business parties to draft ever-lengthier self-serving contract terms that consumers neither read nor understand.6
Consumers routinely click the "I Agree" or "I accept" button, or
just continue using the website after having access to the terms,
thus giving the false appearance of assent.' Ironically, the proposed Restatement would actually relax assent rules, and bind consumers with only minimal requirements of notice and opportunity

to read the terms.' Unfortunately, many times these standard form
contracts contain unwelcome surprises such as mandatory arbitration clauses, waivers of class actions, non-disparagement clauses
and agreements to the sale or sharing of personal information.
The Reporters of the proposed Restatement freely admit in
their Introductory Note that the consumer's "I Accept" click is at
most a statement that "I know I am agreeing to something, but I
don't know to what. I trust that if something really bad is buried

Consumer ContractsProjectSession, THE ALI REPORTER, Summer 2019,
at 7. (Only Section One of nine sections was approved at the annual meeting).
6 TD, supra note 2, at 2.
Daniel D. Barnhizer, Escaping Toxic Contracts, How We Have Lost the
War on Assent in Wrap Contracts, 44 Sw. L. REV. 215 (2014).
8 TD, supra note 2, Black Letter Section 2, Adoption of Standard Contract
Terms, at 130.
542
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in the fine print, the law will protect me from its bite." 9 And yet,

the proposed Restatement accepts the cases that bind consumers
to standard form contracts whether presented by "click wrap,"
"browse wrap," or "Pay Now, Terms Later," as long as the consumer "manifests assent" combined with an adequate notice of and
opportunity to review terms.10 Since this "assent" is neither meaningful nor informed, the consumer assent in this context is a legal
fiction.

The Reporters say that the relaxed standard of assent is
needed to make sure that online commerce can go forward because
consumer contracts must be formed in an efficient manner." Consumers usually at least know the basic terms of the transaction,
such as what product they are buying, the price, and the shipping
terms. As to the other terms, all agree it would be impractical to
force people to actually read and understand these terms prior to
consenting. So the Reporters proposed a "GRAND BARGAIN":
"fairly unrestricted freedom for businesses to draft and affix their
terms to the transaction, balanced by a set of substantive boundary
restrictions, prohibiting businesses from going too far." 2 The restrictions that keep businesses from going too far are mainly the
doctrines of unconscionability and the law of deception.
The proposed Restatement's Unconscionability section
states that a contract term should be deemed "unconscionable" and
therefore unenforceable if the term is both substantively and procedurally unconscionable. A sliding scale approach is recommended. 3 The section on Deception states that "a contract or term
agreed to as a result of a deceptive act or practice is voidable by
the consumer." 4 This seems to reflect current contract law if nothing else.
9 TD, supra note 2, Reporters' Introduction, at 2.
10 TD, supra note 2, Black Letter Section 2(a), Adoption of Standard Contract Terms.
" TD, supranote 2, Reporters' Introduction, at 1.
12 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACTS Introductory Note (AM. LAW
INST., Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2015) The "grand bargain" language was ultimately dropped from the Tentative Draft presented in 2019, but the general idea
remains.
13 TD, supra note 2, Black Letter Section 5, at 132. Sliding scale means that
"in determining that a contract or a term is unconscionable, a greater degree of
one of the elements [substantive or procedural unconscionability] ... means that
a lesser degree of the other element is sufficient to establish unconscionability."
14 TD, supra note 2, Black Letter Section 6, at 132.
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The "grand bargain," unfortunately, isn't very "grand" for

consumers. First, once common law judges can use the new Restatement (if adopted) to conclude there is "assent" by the consumer, even though it is a legal fiction, they are not likely to deliver
on the other part of the bargain by strengthening the unconscionability or deception doctrines. Most tradition-bound judges applying common law doctrines just do not like to interfere with contracts in this manner.

Nor will the private arbitrators to whom

many consumer disputes are being referred these days. Secondly,
the "grand bargain" approach puts the burden on the consumer to
use unconscionability or deception as a shield against unfavorable
clauses. Given the small size of most individual consumer claims,
restrictions on class actions, and the mandating of private arbitrations, consumers are unlikely to be able to take advantage of these
proffered shields from the abuses lurking in those "standard"
terms.

What I propose in this Article, would be a revision of the
section on "Adoption of Standard Contract Terms" to say the following:

The consumer constructively agrees to adopt the core
transactional terms as well as the conscionable terms to
which they have signified assent. The consumer is not
legally bound by any terms that are unconscionable or
result from a deceptive act or practice or are otherwise in
violation of applicable law. The party seeking to enforce
a contract term has the burden of proving that the term
or terms are legal, and neither unconscionable nor based
on a deceptive act or practice.

This article will lay out this argument in more detail as follows.

After this Part I, Introduction and Overview, Part II will

summarize the chronology and evolution of the Proposed Restatement, with a focus on consumer assent and defenses. 5 Part III will
Other sections of the TD are beyond the scope of this article.
For instance,
Section 3 on Modification of Standard Terms, allows the merchant or service
provider to unilaterally modify terms as long as the consumer receives a reasonable notice and opportunity to reject the proposed modification, which can take
place passively, by virtue of the consumer continuing the contractual relationship after the expiration of the rejection period. This type of modification is
becoming widespread in consumer contracts and could pose assent issues similar
to the ones raised here about Section 2. See Shmuel I. Becher & Uri Benoliel,
iS
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review the current literature and cases on consumer assent to
standard terms, particularly online terms, to demonstrate the fact
that the term "assent" in these situations is a legal fiction. Part IV
shows the notice and opportunity to review test currently being
applied to consumer standardized contracts, does not amount to
real assent. The current approach, which is also included in the
proposed Restatement, results in judges reviewing in some detail
the form of the notice of terms on a website or mobile app, a meaningless exercise since it is well known that the vast majority of consumers never read past the core transactional terms. Part V will
address the reasons why the doctrines of unconscionability and deception are insufficient to protect consumers from enforcement of
abusive and unexpected terms. Part VI will flesh out the proposed
modification quoted above. Part VII will provide a conclusion.

II. CHRONOLOGY AND EVOLUTION OF THE PROPOSED
RESTATEMENT

The Proposed Restatement of Consumer Contracts has had
a lengthy and arduous evolution to reach its present incarnation.
It involved the work of three designated Reporters, a group of selected "Advisers," a "Members' Consultative Group (MCG)," the
ALI Council, and the general membership of the ALI.1 6 The project began in 2012 and still had not reached a resolution as of 2019.
The Tentative Draft presented in 2019, like all Restatements, includes the Black Letter sections, Comments, Illustrations and Reporters' Notes. Over the years, what started out as a statement of
basic concepts was fleshed out and revised as each iteration was
circulated and commented on by the Advisers, the MCG and the
ALI Council. As I will document in this section, at each stage, the
proposal was subject to robust criticism. In this author's opinion,
however, the Reporters did not waver much from the original

thrust of the project despite these objections.

Sneak in Contracts: An EmpiricalPerspective, 55 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525212.
16 The Reporters are Oren Bar-Gill, Harvard Law School, Omri Ben-Shahar, University of Chicago Law School, and Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, New
York University Law School, all law professors. The Advisers are a select group
of lawyers, judges and academics, and the Members Consultative Group are
ALI members who have volunteered their interest in contributing to the project.
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The first meeting of the Advisers group with the Reporters
occurred on November 30, 2012. There were only two reporters at
that time, Omri Ben-Shahar of the University of Chicago Law
School and Orem Bar-Gill, at that time of New York University

Law School. An industry lawyer representing the consumer finance sector noted that there were very few representatives from
business on the Advisers Committee, as compared to the number
of government, judicial and academic members. At his urging, additional business representatives were added."
At this initial meeting, the Reporters presented a draft outline of the project, which was still very broad. The reporters determined that there were fundamental legal and practical differences
between business to business (B2B) contracts and business to consumer contracts. At this time, the Reporters stated that the purpose of the Restatement project was to "clarify the conceptual and
normative foundations of consumer contracts law,

...

not to re-

form the law." 8 How to treat the large body of consumer law contained in statutes was left open.
This very first meeting agenda also included a discussion of
the controversial issue of assuring meaningful assent by consumers
to contract terms, especially online contracts. Passive or silent assent to contract modifications imposed by businesses was also discussed. Even in this early draft, the reporters duly noted that "it is
well known, and empirically established that consumers rarely
read the contracts that govern so many aspects of their everyday
life. And, without reading, there is no meaningful assent to the concrete content of the contracts."1 9 The Reporters said the doctrine of
unconscionability in consumer contracts would be treated separately. The closely related doctrine of "unfair and deceptive acts
and practices" from FTC jurisprudence and similar doctrines administered by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau were

also noted.
The second meeting of the Advisers was held on December
5, 2013. At this time the reporters circulated a much longer "Pre-

" Consumer Fin. Services Grp., ALI Launches Restatement Project for
Consumer Contracts, BALLARD SPAHR (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/ le galalerts/2012-12-06-ali-launches-restatementproject -for-consumer-con tracts. aspx.
18

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST., Draft Outline,

2012).
19

Id
546
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Draft." This draft focused on three substantive provisions: Adoption of Standard Terms, Unconscionability and Deception.
As to consumer assent, the Reporters' Introductory Note to
the 2013 Pre-Draft recognized that actual assent to terms that consumers do not read is not plausible, and instead the law should
permit contract formation without relying on consumers reading

the fine print. In this draft, the Reporters introduced the concept
that "salient" terms are at the core of the bargain, and consumers
can be bound to them. But "non-salient" terms could be policed by
the courts under the doctrine of unconscionability or by providing
an opportunity for consumers to withdraw from the contract after
receiving the terms. The Reporters maintained that the term "salient" was not the same as conspicuous disclosure, but rather had
a more market-based definition, i.e., whether a term would make
a difference to a portion of the consumer market.
The first version of the "black letter" on "adoption of standard terms" was very brief and stated rather broadly that standard
contract terms become part of the contract if "the consumer signified assent" to those terms. 20 This language does not require reading or "meaningful" assent. This early version also would allow
terms to be binding on the consumer even if the consumer did not
signify assent at the time of formation, but rather was given an
opportunity to withdraw or "exit" from such a "rolling" contract
upon receipt of the terms, also known as Pay Now Terms Later
(PNTL) contracts. 2 ' Thus the initial version of the proposed Restatement provision on adoption of terms did nothing to address
the widely recognized fact that when consumers "signify assent" to
standard terms they generally have not read or understood the
standard terms. The basic requirement of traditional contract law
that the parties must have given their assent in order to be bound
is seemingly absent.
The proffered section on "unconscionability" would provide more concrete guidance to courts trying to determine if a contract should be void as unconscionable.2 2 This draft applied the
traditional two-prong test for unconscionability, i.e., both substantive and procedural unconscionability must be present to void a

20 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACTS

§

2 (AM. LAW INST., Pre-Draft

Provisions, 2013).
21 Id
22

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

U.C.C.

§ 2-302 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977).
547
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contract.23 This draft also employed the novel and unprecedented
use of the term "salient" to describe what kinds of terms might be
procedurally unconscionable, i.e., all "non-salient" terms could
qualify as procedurally unconscionable. This terminology became
a subject of much debate and was ultimately dropped from the final version of the Black Letter portion of the draft Restatement,
but remained in the Reporters' Notes.
The early draft also contained a section on deception, which
echoed the statutory consumer law against deceptive trade practices, and would allow consumers to void a contract or a term that
was the result of a misrepresentation of the contract terms. The
proposal would place the burden of proving the existence of such
a deceptive practice on the consumer. No particular remedy for
consumers was endorsed, and the draft Restatement took no position on mandatory arbitration of consumer contracts.
This initial presentation of the proposed Restatement of the
Law of Consumer Contracts in 2013 met with some vigorous cri-

tiques by members of the ALI Advisers and Members Consultative
Group. For example, one critic questioned why the draft Restatement purported to bind consumers to every term in a standard
form contract, when the better rule would be to bind them only to
terms "not beyond reasonable expectations." Another commenter
wrote that consumer contracts are written by businesses to be unreadable by consumers but that contract law should be about some
rough meeting of the minds. Another commenter noted that most
of the important tenets of consumer law are statutory, not common
law, whereas the proposed Restatement addressed only common
law. She said that statutory "deception" is broader than common
law contract "misrepresentation." This person also argued that unconscionability is very weak as consumer defense, because it is
dealt with case by case. A letter to ALI Council from a group of
law professors (including this author) also stressed the importance
of public statutory law over private contract law in the consumer
field.
Preliminary Draft No. 1, dated October 28, 2014, was pre-

sented to the Members Consultative Group and the Advisers on
November 13-14, 2014 in Chicago. This was followed by Council
Draft No. 1 in January 2015. At this time, Professor Florencia
See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); see also Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
23

548
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Marotta-Wurgler joined as an Associate Reporter and contributed
a quantitative analysis of all published opinions on selected topics.
The main points of controversy in this draft were centered on the
empirical study, the section on adoption of terms, and unconscionability.
The empirical caselaw analysis found that most courts enforce standard terms in online contracts appearing in various formats, such as "clickwrap" and "browsewrap" or "Pay Now Terms
Later," as long as there was notice of the terms and opportunity to
review and/or reject the transaction. The empirical study was criticized for just "counting noses" and not analyzing the reasons given
in the cases for the outcomes and determining which cases represented the better rule. While praising the attempt to quantify precedents in a rigorous manner, one commenter pointed out that in
consumer contract cases, published appellate opinions do not represent the major instances of consumer losses due to unconscionable conduct and deception.
This 2014 version of the draft Restatement continued to
recognize that consumer assent to standard form contracts is
mostly passive, and does not involve a clear understanding of all
the terms. Under this draft, terms would be considered "adopted"
if the consumer "signified assent," or if the consumer did nothing
after later receiving adequate notice of the terms, while also having
a meaningful opportunity to review. Actual, informed assent was
not expected in the case of standard terms in consumer contracts,
but the terms would nonetheless be binding, with the protection of
"exit" rights in some situations, as well as the doctrines of unconscionability and deception.
Unconscionability and deception were retained in this draft
as being tools to counterbalance any abuses that may arise due to
the passive nature of the consumer assent. The use of the word
"salient" as it affects procedural unconscionability was treated extensively in the Reporters' comments, but did not appear in the
black letter. For deception, this draft adopted the doctrines developed by the FTC and states under consumer protection statutes.
While conceding that the description of the caselaw on consumer standard term contracts is probably accurate, some urged
the ALI to attempt to be more normative rather than relying on a
form of consumer assent that all recognize is meaningless as to
most of the non-essential terms of the contract. Also, one commenter pointed out that the consumer bears the heavier burden of
549
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proving unconscionability and deception whereas the business
bears the relatively lighter burden of proving assent.
Preliminary Draft No. 2, dated October 20, 2015, was discussed at ALI headquarters in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.24 An
expanded version of the empirical case analysis was included with
this draft. This draft adopted a "grand bargain" approach which
basically asserts that consumer assent to standard terms inserted
by business parties should be relatively permissive because those
terms would counter-balanced by the potential defenses of unconscionability and deception. Another rationale proffered by the Reporters for the permissive approach to consumer assent was that it
benefits all parties for consumer transactions to be speedily concluded, and that any attempt to force consumers to read and understand these increasingly complex terms would not be helpful to
that end. The doctrines of unconscionability and deception, which
could be raised by consumers to counteract abusive contract
clauses, were deemed sufficient protection. Preliminary Draft #2
also clarified that the Restatement is intended to include privacy
notices just like any other consumer contract.
Controversy swirled again around these drafts. Some criticized the accuracy and/or the idea/methodology of the empirical
study of cases, particularly the Pay Now Terms Later (PNTL) category. The statistics were criticized for being a "bean-counting" approach that does not recognize that the ALI should select the "better" approach, not just the majority approach. It was also noted
that the common law of consumer contracts is rooted in state law,
yet the table of cases is heavily tilted toward federal cases.
At this juncture, critics argued that Section Two, Adoption
of Terms, perpetuated the fiction of consumer assent in these situations, and incorporated too much of the harsh doctrines surrounding contract law than are warranted given the more protective

stance of most relevant consumer statutes. The issue of potentially
abusive standardized contract terms has been exacerbated by the
prevalence of online contracts, in which increasingly long and complex clauses are offered, and which can be effectively accepted by

24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary

Draft No. 3, 2015). This preliminary draft was followed by RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 2, 2016), and
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 3,

2016).
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a simple "click" on a button without any realistic possibility that
the accepting party will actually read these terms.
The Reporters proffered the "grand bargain" as counteracting the truism that consumers will not and probably should not be
forced to read contract terms. This "bargain" was criticized as favoring the more powerful contracting parties, i.e., the businesses
writing the contracts, by lowering the standard of proof for consumer assent, whereas the consumer class's erstwhile protection
from abuse involves the burden of proving either that a particular
clause or contract is "unconscionable," a concept that has been difficult for consumers to successfully plead, or proving deception,
which is also a complex and uncertain remedy.
Some participants in the process argued in favor of a Restatement recommendation for stronger limits on contract abuses
that would apply across the board without the need for consumers
to raise them as defenses in litigation. These arguments were dismissed as going beyond a "restatement" of the law, and instead
seeking to promote more radical changes in the law than are currently seen in the cases, as documented in the empirical study. In
the later iterations of the proposed Restatement, the drafters also
argued that the draft is promoting a greater conceptual unity
across the common law and statutory consumer protection laws,
and that the quantitative empirical method used to justify the proposal is rigorous and more comprehensive than the traditional legal analysis.
Several further drafts were presented and discussed during
2017 and 2018.25

During this period, several scholars joined in a

critique of the conclusions and methodology of the empirical,
quantitative studies used to support the draft Restatement of the
Law of Consumer Contracts. The methodology, the cases included
and not included, the time frame of cases included, and differences
between holding and dicta, federal and state, and trial and appellate court cases, were all factors in this critique. 26
25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACTS

§

1-9 (AM. LAW INST., Discus-

sion Draft, 2017) (discussed at ALI Annual Meeting); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2017) (discussed with
Advisers and Members Consultative Group at ALI Headquarters, Philadelphia); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary
Draft No. 4, 2017) (presented to Council of ALI in Philadelphia, PA on Jan. 1819, 2018).
26 See Adam J. Levitin et al., The Faulty Foundationof the Draft Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 447 (2019); Gregory Klass,
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As to the inadequacy of the defensive doctrines of unconscionability and deception to protect consumers, it was again noted
this approach places the burden of proof on the consumer. Some
noted that American common law judges are loathe to overturn
contracts or contract clauses based on such doctrines, which traditionally have been viewed as being reserved for extreme situations.
While European consumers are protected by a "black list" of
banned consumer contract terms,2 7 common law judges in the
United States apply the unconscionability doctrine with much less
specific guidance. Thus, the ALI Reporters' "grand bargain" appears to be more protective of business interests than of consumers
in that the defensive doctrines are much weaker than the newly
endorsed permissive standards for assent to standard terms, which
have been exploding in the era of internet contracting.
Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts Tentative
Draft or TD (April 18, 2019)28, was discussed at length by the ALI
members at the annual meeting held in May of 2019 in Washington, D.C. At this juncture, the controversial empirical findings as
well as the use of the term "salience" were relegated to the Reporters' Notes, and all references to the term "Grand Bargain" were
eliminated. Despite these changes, neither the Reporters nor the
ALI Council made any major concessions on the larger points of
disagreement. Thus, it is not surprising that at this stage there was
a rather large outpouring of opposition. The criticisms consisted
of two published articles questioning the methodology and conclusions of the Reporters' empirical case studies, 29 as well as broader
arguments that the proposed Restatement would diminish the legal protection of consumers in an unwarranted manner. Motions
to terminate, revise, and change the project from a Restatement to
a Principles project, were considered at the Annual Meeting on
Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract
Law, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 45 (2019). These scholars raise serious concerns about
significant flaws in the empirical case analysis associated with the draft Restatement. While not discounting the importance of this aspect of the criticism of the
draft Restatement, this article will focus for the most part on a critique of the
substance of the sections on adoption of standard terms, unconscionability and
deception.
27 See Council Directive 93/13, Annex, 1993 O.J. (L 95) (EC) (list of unfair
consumer contract terms in European nations).
28 TD, supra note 2. The Tentative Draft was preceded by Council Draft
No. 4 (Sept. 19, 2018).
29 See supra note 26.
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May 21, 2019. Only Section One of the Tentative Draft, "Definitions and Scope", was adopted. 30 Due to the length of the discussion and debate of the various motions, the remaining sections
were left to be considered at a later meeting. Highlights of the discussion and the submitted comments are summarized below.
Current and former consumer protection government attorneys submitted comments, objecting broadly to the basic thrust of
the proposed Restatement, as well as to the data on which it is
based. Twenty-four state attorneys general sent a letter to ALI
members shortly before the annual meeting, in which they argued
that, contrary to the assertion in the TD, the unconscionability doctrine is not good protection for consumers because consumers do
not have the resources to litigate, and because the use of the "salience" concept would be unprecedented and confusing. 3 ' Richard
Cordray, former Director of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau and a former Ohio Attorney General, argued in his own
letter that the use of "unconscionability" alone is insufficient to protect consumers, and that the "unfairness" doctrine found in the
FTC Act, the Consumer Financial Protection Act and state UDAP
laws is broader and would be a better standard. He also argued
that the draft should have included a defense for consumers if a
contract clause failed to meet "reasonable expectations."3 2 David
Vladeck, former head of the Federal Trade Commission's Consumer Protection Bureau, and currently a Georgetown Law Pro-

fessor, pointed out that unlike for other Restatements, there is
simply not a large enough body of state court common law cases
on consumer law to justify a "restatement." He surmised that the
dearth of private cases may be due to the prevalence of arbitration
clauses and class action waivers. He also noted that there are many
more government consumer protection cases, state and federal,
than private cases, but that these government cases were not
counted in the Restatement Reporters' case data base.33

30 See THE ALI REPORTER, Summer 2019 Newsletter, supranote 5.
31 Letter from Letitia James, New York Attorney General et al., to Members
of AM. LAW INST. (May 14, 2019) (https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/letter_to_ali_members.pdf).
32 Letter from Richard Cordray, Esq., to Richard L. Revesz, Director of AM.
LAW INST. (May 19, 2019) (https://pubcit.typepad.com/files/cordray-oppositionletter-1.pdf).
" Letter from David C. Vladeck, A, B. Chettle, Jr., Professor of Law,
Georgetown
Law,
to
AM.
LAW
INST.
(May
15,
2019).
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At the meeting itself, there were several motions put forward followed by lengthy discussions. Section One on Definitions
and Scope was passed, with an amendment to make it clear that
the Proposed Restatement would not cover contracts for the sale of
goods that are already covered by Uniform Commercial Code Article 2." The remainder of the meeting comprised lengthy debates
on various motions, including one put forth by Adam Levitin of

Georgetown Law School.35 This motion proposed to substitute for
the Reporters' language of Section 2, Adoption of Standard Contract Terms, some alternative language that would incorporate
standard terms as enforceable "only if a reasonable consumer
would expect such terms." This amendment was inspired by and
largely incorporated the approach found in Restatement (Second)
of the Law of Contracts, Section 211(3), which states that for contracts with standardized terms:
Where the party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the
writing contained a particular term, the term is not part

of the agreement.
This approach has the advantage of eliminating the legal
fiction contained in the Tentative Draft that consumers have assented to standard terms if they have notice and have signified assent, while substituting a requirement that consumers would not
be bound to terms they would not reasonably expect. It also has
the advantage of incorporating the concepts found in the pre-existing and broader Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 36 The motion
drafter asserted that this language protects consumers and expedites mass consumer contracts, while not binding consumers to unexpected terms. This motion to amend failed. The time for discussion ran out before any further headway was made on the
Tentative Draft.

https://www.ali. org/smedia/filer private/5 c/ab/5cabc7ea-cfce-453 2-a7 9d2a13a55036f8/vladeck_-_consumer_contracts_-_td_-_051519.pdf.
3 See THE ALI REPORTER, Summer 2019 Newsletter, supranote 5.
3 Proceedings of the 2019 Annual Meeting, 96 A.L.I Proc. X (2019) (motion
by Adam Levitin, joined by Girardeau Spann).
36 Unfortunately, this particular provision in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts has not been widely followed in the courts. See Wayne R. Barnes,
Toward a FairerModel of Consumer Assent to StandardForm Contracts: In
Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227 (2007).
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III. THE LEGAL FICTION OF CONSUMER ASSENT
At the heart of the Tentative Draft is Section 2, Adoption
of Standard Contract Terms. Section 2(a) of the black letter portion
states that such terms are "adopted" if the consumer "manifests assent" after receiving (1) "a reasonable notice of the standard contract term and of the intent to include the term as part of the consumer contract, and (2) a reasonable opportunity to review the
standard contract term." Section 2(b) deals with adoption of terms
after the consumer manifests assent to the transaction, the socalled "Pay Now, Terms Later" (PNTL) situation. In this case, the
consumer is bound to the later revealed terms if they had notice
before manifesting assent to the transaction that terms would be
coming later, and after receiving them, was given a reasonable opportunity to review the term or terms as well as a reasonable opportunity to terminate the transaction without unreasonable cost,
loss of value or personal burden, and nonetheless did not terminate."

The Reporters maintain that this wording embodies the
current state of the common law of consumer contracts, as revealed
by the majority of reported cases. 38 While the TD does indeed "restate" the current common law, it does not attempt to suggest any
needed course correction. Indeed, if one reviews the history of the
common law of standard form contracts, it is clear that this proposed Restatement, and perhaps most of the court cases themselves, have in effect strayed from one of the theoretical underpinnings of presumed consumer assent to standard contract terms,
and that is the "duty to read." This is not to say that consumers
should be forced to read the hidden standard terms prior to assent,
but rather that the law should recognize the reality that the "duty
to read" standard is no longer practical.
Mutual assent is a core requirement for contract formation
at common law. 39 As stated by Supreme Court Justice (then Circuit Court Judge) Sonia Sotomayor, "[m]utual manifestation of assent, whether by written or spoken word or by conduct, is the
touchstone of contract."4 0 This principle has been accepted for all

3 TD, supranote 2, Black Letter, Section 2, Adoption of Standard Contract
Terms.
38 TD, Reporters' Notes to
Section 2.

§ 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Specht v. Netscape Commc'n Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2002).

39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
40
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contracts, including old-fashioned printed standard form contracts, as well as the newer internet-based contracts where the consumer manifests assent by clicking a button or by other online conduct. In such contracts, by definition, one party, the business
party, is the author of the contract terms, and the other party, the
consumer, passively accepts the terms. Under current law, such
acceptance or assent, whether by signature or other means, binds
the consumer to all the terms. And yet, most scholars and researchers agree that virtually no ordinary consumers ever read these
terms. 4 1 Two of the Reporters themselves have authored studies
that reached this same conclusion and acknowledge this in the Reporters' Notes. 42 So how can there be assent if one party to the
contract has not read most of the contract terms? To answer that
question, one must go back to some of the classic doctrines of the
common law of contracts.
First year law students dealing with the common law of
contracts are often dismayed by the fact that judges have no mercy
on people who sign contracts without reading them. As stated by
Seventh Circuit Court Judge Easterbrook in the (in)famous case of
Hill v. Gateway, "A contract need not be read to be effective; people who accept take the risk that the unread terms may in retrospect prove unwelcome."4 3 The basic concept is that when people
sign something (or manifest assent online to something) that they
know is a contract, they have a "duty to read" the terms. 44 If they
do not fulfill this "duty" it is their own fault that they find

41 See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse ConsequencesofDisclosing
StandardTerms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117 (2017) (reviewing evidence that no
one actually reads standard terms of online contracts); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, StandardForm Contractinginthe ElectronicAge, 7 7 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 429 (2002).
42 Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to StandardForm Contracts,

43(1) J. LEGAL STUD.1 (2014); OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER
MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED

DISCLOSURE, Ch. 2 (2014), as cited in Reporters' Notes to TD Section 2.
43 Hill v. Gateway 2000 Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997).
44 See generally, John D. Calamari, Duty to Read-A Changing Concept, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 341 (1974). See also Stephen W. Feldman, Mutual Assent,
Normative Degradation,andMass Market StandardForm Contracts-A TwoPart Critique of Boilerplate: The Fine Print, VanishingRights and the Rule of
Law(PartI), 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 408-11 (2014).
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themselves bound to contract terms that may be surprising or unwanted.45
Query: do all those consumers, including yourself dear
reader, who never click on or read those "terms and conditions"
when purchasing items on the Internet, have a "duty" to actually
read all those terms? In the age of e-commerce, the length and
complexity of standard terms that are hidden in the unexplored
back roads of the seller's website are getting denser than ever. 46
Contrary to the idea that one has a "duty" to read what you are
agreeing to, there are a number of perfectly rational reasons why
people do not do so in the context of online standard contracts.
First, as noted, these terms are becoming exceedingly long and
complicated, thus requiring quite a bit of time to a read. Second,
these terms are written in anticipation of litigation, to be read by
lawyers and judges, not by laypeople who will undoubtedly have
some difficulty understanding them if they attempted to do so. 47
Third, most standard terms, by their nature, are not negotiable, so
it may appear futile to read them since they are not likely to be
changed. If a dutiful consumer were to check the equivalent contract terms of competing sellers, not only would this take even
more time, but it is likely that the competitors use very similar
terms. Typically, the only choice is to forego the transaction altogether or agree to the terms. Thus, it seems counterproductive to
require or encourage ordinary consumers to slog through all the
terms and conditions to which they "manifest assent" by clicking
"I agree" or its equivalent.
Indeed, the proposed Restatement of Consumer Contracts,
while requiring notice of terms and an opportunity to review them

prior to a binding manifestation of assent (hereafter "notice and
opportunity"), does not appear to support the "duty to read" as a

rationale for binding assent to the unread terms. The Reporters
acknowledge in their Introduction to the TD that "[i]t is both irrational and infeasible for most consumers to keep up with the
" Some modern cases have softened the "duty to read" doctrine by holding
that lack of adequate notice of terms can nullify what might otherwise have been
deemed as binding assent. See infra Section IV of this article. As one court put
it "the duty to read does not morph into a duty to ferret out contract provisions
when they are contained in inconspicuous hyperlinks." Starke v. SquareTrade,
Inc., 913 F.3d 279, 295 (2d Cir. 2019).
46 SeeNancy S. Kim, Clickingand Cringing,86 OR. L. REV. 797, 829 (2007).
47 Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 233 (2002).
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increasingly complex terms provided by businesses in the multitude of transactions, large and small, entered into daily."48 In today's world, no one, not even the most conservative of common
law judges, nor the Reporters for the proposed Restatement, want
to force consumers to read, understand and/or negotiate the "fine
print"to which they are being bound. But if there is neither a duty
nor an expectation that consumers will read the terms, then what
is the basis for finding that the terms are adopted if the requirements of notice, opportunity to review and manifestation of assent
are fulfilled? It is no longer feasible to argue that consumers who
do not read "take the risk" that unread terms will be unwelcome
but binding, and that it is basically their own fault if they enter into

contracts with terms they do not like. Thus, it is a modern day
"legal fiction" that consumers have in fact or by defaulting on their
duty to read, assented to the boilerplate terms of the contract.
If consumers are not actually agreeing to all the terms in
standard form contracts, then what are they agreeing to? The
great legal realist and contract law scholar Karl Llewellyn, long
ago articulated the oft-quoted concept of "blanket assent" in consumer contracts, as follows:
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses,
we can recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there
is no assent at all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type
of the transaction, and but one thing more. That one
thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to
any not unreasonable or indecent terms .. .which do not
alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered
terms. The fine print which has not been read has no
business to cut under the reasonable meaning of those
dickered which constitutes the dominant and only real
expression of agreement. 49

The current TD Reporters say they are implementing Llewellyn's approach,50 but there are some crucial differences. The language of the proposed Restatement says all the terms are adopted
(assented to?) by the consumer's manifestation of assent once the
48

TD, supra note 2, Introduction.

49 KARL N. LLLEWELYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION -

APPEALS 370 (1960).
SO TD, supra note 2, Introduction.
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requisite notice and opportunity to review are provided, but Llewellyn said the blanket assent was only an assent to "any not unreasonable or indecent terms ... which do not alter or eviscerate the
reasonable meaning of the dickered terms."5' The proposed Restatement, by contrast, would posit wholesale adoption of all the
terms, subject to consumer defenses of unconscionability or deception. This is not quite the same as recognizing a "blanket assent"
that does not include unreasonable terms. Indeed, as will be explained further below, the proposed Restatement puts more of a
burden on the consumer to prove that they should not be bound by
certain terms, than it does on the merchant to prove that such
terms have been included in some kind of "blanket assent."
While of course all the terms of a contract should always be
available to all parties prior to consummation, the mere fact of notice and opportunity to review coupled with a manifestation of assent should not in itself bind the consumer to all of those terms,
given the current state of affairs with consumer contracts. The
manifestation of assent as stated in the proposed Restatement is a
legal fiction since, by all accounts, consumers cannot in fact assent
to terms they do not even know about. Legal fictions are not inherently bad, however, and have been employed over the years as
a way to expand the law without major disruptions. 2 Professor
Lon Fuller years ago defined legal fictions as either "(1) a statement
propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity,
or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility." 3 A prime example often used is the "attractive nuisance" fiction, by which the
law holds that property owners "invite" children onto their property by setting up a dangerous situation that attracts youngsters, in

order to hold the property owner liable for the resulting injuries to
the children who are in fact trespassing. 54 In this situation, it is
evident that landowners do not actually "invite" children to trespass on their property, but it is a helpful way for judges to make a
justifiable exception to the rule against landowner liability to trespassers.

This type of legal fiction can be useful in moving the law in
a more progressive direction, but legal fictions become dangerous

" Llewellyn, supranote 49, at 370.
52 Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435 (2007).
3

LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967).

Chunlin Leonhard, Dangerous or Benign Legal Fictions, Cognitive Biases, and Consentin ContractLaw, 91 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 385, 390-92 (2017).
4
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if they are not openly acknowledged as such, and become a substitute for difficult judgments.5 5 In the case of the fictional consumer
"assent" to standard terms that they do not read, this could be a
useful fiction because without it, efficient forms of mass consumer
transactions would be stymied. The problem with this fiction is
that under current caselaw, as well as under the proposed restatement, this type of consumer assent is not labeled as "presumed,"
"constructive" or "blanket" assent. Since it is treated as real, unqualified assent, the outgunned consumer must use defenses such
as unconscionability or deception to protect themselves from merchant abuses. As noted by Llewellyn and by the Reporters themselves, consumers in the standard term situation are only actually
assenting to the "dickered" terms, and their assent to other terms is
inferred. Yet the proposed Restatement, unlike Llewellyn's "blanket" assent, does not openly recognize that the assent to standard
terms is a fiction, and that it does not include assent to unreasonable terms. Such an unacknowledged fiction can be dangerous.
Instead of employing an unqualified and unacknowledged
legal fiction of consumer assent, the proposed Restatement of Consumer Contracts could have incorporated either directly or by reference, the doctrine of "reasonable expectations" as articulated in
Restatement (2d) of Contracts, § 211(3). This portion of the general
Restatement of Contracts states in pertinent part:
Where the other party has reason to believe that the party
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that
the writing contained a particular term, the term is not
part of the agreement.5 6

While this language could have been a step forward in making contract doctrine more compatible with the reality of consumer contracts, it was not widely adopted in the courts in the years following the release of the Restatement 2d.57 Some of the opponents of
this section concluded that it went too far in terms of relying on the
"

Id at 394-95.

56

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,

§ 211(3). A floor amendment

to adopt this language in lieu of the TD's Section 2 was defeated at the Annual
Meeting May 21, 2019. See discussion supra, text accompanying notes 35-36.
" Of the few cases that adopted Section 211, most involved insurance contracts, and most were decided by courts in Arizona. See James J. White, Form
Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 315 (1997). Perhaps this
lack of adoption explains why the Reporters chose not to refer to this approach?
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subjective intent of the parties to interpret contracts, as opposed

relying solely on the objective expression of the terms.5 8 Others
conclude that this particular section of the Restatement failed to
protect consumers because the bar was set too high for consumers
to succeed in using it to avoid unreasonable terms. 9
While Section 211(3) of the Restatement (2d) of Contracts is
not a perfect solution to the lack of true assent to standard terms
in consumer contracts, it still recognizes that manifestations of assent by consumers as to standard terms is a special case that should
be governed by slightly different rules than those that govern negotiated business-to-business contracts. For unstated reasons,
however, the "reasonable expectations" approach of Section 211(3)
was not adopted or even discussed by the Reporters in the Tentative Draft of the proposed Restatement of Consumer Contracts.

IV.

NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW

REQUIREMENTS

DO

NOT NECESSARILY EQUAL

ASSENT
The Reporters note that most courts that have considered
the issue of assent to standard terms by consumers, have applied
the notice of terms and opportunity to review test. That is to say,
if consumers are deemed to have had adequate notice of the fact
that they are being asked to agree to some terms, and also have a
reasonable opportunity to review the terms prior to manifesting
their assent, then the consumer will be bound to the terms. 60 This
test continues to be applied even for online standard terms which,
as discussed in the prior section, no one expects consumers to read.
As will be discussed in this section, the continued application of
this test in the absence of a duty or expectation of reading ends up
58 Wayne R. Barnes, Towarda FairerModel of ConsumerAssent to StandardForm Contracts:In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WAsH. L.
REV. 227, 265 (2007).
9 Eric A. Zacks, The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211: Unfulfilled
Expectations and the Future of Modern StandardizedConsumer Contracts, 7
WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 733 (2016).
60 Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012). This required
notice is sometimes referred to as "inquiry notice." Id., 697 F.3d at 120. As
applied in the Schnabel case itself, however, the provision of terms in a followup email after the transaction was completed was not considered sufficient notice. Id.
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being a rather meaningless exercise and has allowed businesses to
impose all manner of contract terms in situations where consumers
may have no awareness of what they have "agreed" to or even that
they have agreed to a contract.
As the Reporters point out in their notes, there are many
court cases that try to determine whether consumers have had adequate notice that there are contract terms and have had an adequate opportunity to review them (the "notice and opportunity"

test) prior to manifesting their assent to the contract. If these prerequisites are met, and the consumer somehow manifests assent
even if they have not read the terms, the consumer is bound. However, the parameters of adequate notice and opportunity to review
as set forth in the caselaw has been confusing and contradictory
thus far.6' These cases have sometimes found the notice and opportunity to be sufficient and sometimes have not, for reasons that
are very fact-intensive. In addition to uncertainty of outcomes, the
use of this test of consumer assent requires the courts to get involved in the details of website or mobile app design in order to
assure that consumers will notice and at least have an opportunity
to "click on" and read terms which, as outlined above, all agree will
not likely be read. The distinctions between sufficient and insufficient notice and opportunity are often subtle, but one wonders if it
is worth the judicial time and effort to make this determination
given that consumers are not going to read the "terms and conditions" no matter how clearly they are notified.
These online consumer contract scenarios are commonly divided into three basic categories: shrinkwrap, browsewrap and
clickwrap, and more recently, a fourth type of "hybrid wrap" somewhere between browsewrap and clickwrap.1 2 Each of these situations will be considered below.
Shrinkwrap typically involves terms and conditions that

are inside a box literally enclosed in plastic shrinkwrap, but can
also involve situations of purchases such as by telephone where the
customer pays first, and then receives the terms later in a box, and
agrees by not returning the item within a set time.6 3

61

See

NANCY

S.

KIM,

WRAP

CONTRACTS:

FOUNDATIONS

AND

RAMIFICATIONS, 93-109 (2013).
62

See Kim, supra note 61, Chapter Four. See also Nicosia v. Amazon.com,

Inc., 834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016).
63 See Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 743, 75657 (2002).
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In some early cases, consumers purchased software in the
form of a compact disc in a sealed package, or "shrinkwrap."
These consumers in most cases were deemed to have agreed to the
terms and conditions contained inside if they did not take steps to
return the product upon having access to the terms. 64 The same
was true of consumers who purchased a computer on the telephone, paid with a credit card, then received the computer later in
a package which had terms inside. These terms were binding because the consumers were given the opportunity to reject the terms

by returning the computer within a certain period of time but did
not do so.65 This type of notice and opportunity followed by passive acceptance of terms has been common. A recent case involved
packages of roof shingles that had the terms of the warranty and a
mandatory arbitration clause printed inside some clear shrinkwrap
materials delivered to the consumers' rooftop. In that case, the
terms were binding even though the consumers did not read them
because they had notice and an opportunity to review the terms
before accepting by opening the package and not returning the
shingles.66 The court in the shingles packaging case cited Hill v.
Gateway with approval and concluded that the arbitration clause
was binding even if the consumers did not read it because, "purchase terms were available not only on its packaging but also on
its website and over the phone, such that a diligent consumer could
easily have discovered and reviewed them before or after purchase."67

"Browsewrap" contract terms are those which are on a website, often on an obscure link called "Legal" or "Terms and Conditions," and which often purport to bind the consumer who clicks
on something elsewhere on the website, like a "download" or "purchase" button, or simply continues to use the website. Due to the
problematic nature of the consumer notice, browsewrap terms are
often held unenforceable.
In the leading case of Specht v.
Netscape, the software licensing terms were not visible to the user
unless they scrolled down to the next screen, even though they were
purportedly bound by those terms upon clicking a "download" button that was further up. The court concluded that "a consumer's

64

See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).

Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
66 Dye v. Tamko Bldg. Prod., Inc., 908 F.3d 675 (11th Cir. 2018).
67 Id., 908 F.3d at 683. Query how many consumers will actually
see the
large packages of shingles placed on their rooftops by roofers?
65
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clicking on the download button does not communicate assent to
contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer
that clicking on the download button would signify assent to those
terms."68 While browsewrap terms are popular with online retail-

ers as they do not interrupt the flow of the consumer's online shopping, courts have often judged them to be unenforceable due to the
use of website designs that fail to put the user on reasonable notice
that by clicking on something else, they are agreeing to terms and
conditions.69
Courts are most likely to enforce terms in consumer online
contracts in which the consumer must click on an "I agree" or
equivalent button at the end of a scroll-down box containing all
the terms, or if an "I agree" button appears in close and conspicuous proximity to a hyperlink containing the terms and conditions

and the connection between the two is made clear. This type of
arrangement is commonly known as "clickwrap." Some early examples include situations where there was an "I agree" or "I accept" button at the end of a scroll-down presentation of all the
terms, including the contested ones. In these situations, the courts
agreed that the consumers were bound.70 Even when the click button is not at the bottom of a scrolldown, it may be sufficient notice
if there is clear language indicating click means assent to the terms
and the terms are in a readily noticeable and available location
near the click button. This scenario could also be considered
"clickwrap."

As online marketing becomes more sophisticated, websites
are beginning to abandon the more clunky scrollwrap presentation, and instead will have a button that is intended to manifest
assent to terms but does not use clear wording like "I agree." Instead the terms are on a hyperlink placed in a noticeable place near
the button signifying assent. This type of "hybrid"situation is most
likely to involve the courts in detailed examinations of websites to
determine if the notice of terms and opportunity to review the
Specht v. Netscape Commc'n Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29, 30 (2d Cir. 2002).
69 See Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2016) (reasonably prudent offeree would not have noticed the arbitration clause in a browsewrap situation, and therefore did not manifest assent); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (arbitration clause contained in
browsewrap not enforceable due to lack of notice).
70 See Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999); Forrest v. Verizon Commc'n, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. App. 2002);
Barnett v. Network Sol., Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App. 2001).
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terms were adequate. For instance, in Berkson v. Gogo, LLC, a
case involving the marketing of inflight wireless internet service to

airplane passengers, the court closely examined the webpages used
by the marketer." In that case, the company argued the consumer
could be deemed to have accepted the terms and conditions, which
included signing up for a monthly subscription and not just a onetime use, by clicking on a button in the upper right hand corner of
the webpage that said "Sign In," while a smaller much less conspicuous notice in the bottom left stated that "by clicking "sign in" I
agree to the terms of use and privacy policy."'Z The underlined
phrases were hyperlinked to those items. In addition to the court's
visual analysis of the webpage, Judge Weinstein also pointed to the
lack of information as to what the average internet user would
think was meant by the phrase "terms of use," noting that "[e]specially when presented in lowercase, this phrase does not clearly inform a user that she is subjecting herself to a one-sided contract
that purports to modify her basic legal rights and remedies."" Not
surprisingly, the judge concluded that the defendant Gogo had
failed to provide adequate notice to the consumer that by clicking
"sign in" they were agreeing to contract terms.

In Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., the company alleged that
the consumer manifested assent to a mandatory arbitration clause
by clicking on a button that stated, "Place your order." That button was situated in the top right hand corner of the "Review your
order" page, whereas a small print notice on the other side of the
same cluttered web page said "by placing your order, you agree to
Amazon.com's privacy notice and conditions of use." This notice
contained hyperlinks to the relevant documents." In this case, the
court concluded that this situation was a "hybrid" between a true
clickwrap and a browsewrap situation, and reversed the granting
of a motion to dismiss by the lower court because it was not clear
that the consumer was sufficiently on notice and had agreed to the
term at issue (mandatory arbitration)."
With the development of hybrid notice and consent situations, the outcomes of the cases have varied and may well depend
" Berkson v. Gogo, LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). This opinion
went into great detail about the website design and included screenshots of the
relevant portions.
72

Id, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 374.

3 Id, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 380.
4 Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 235-37 (2d Cir. 2016).
7 Id
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on a deep dive into the website's or mobile app's design and wording, to determine if the notice and opportunity to review were indeed sufficient. As one court put it: "Insofar as it turns on the reasonableness of notice, the enforceability of a web-based agreement
is clearly a fact-intensive inquiry."76 The type of notice that is required must at least be such as to put the consumer on notice that
they are somehow agreeing to a contract and to all the terms within
that contract.77 The outcome in such cases can depend on the details of the website design. For instance, in a case in which a Facebook user was shown a notice immediately below the "Sign Up"
button, that stated "By clicking Sign Up, you are indicating that
you have read and agree to the Terms and Service," the user was
bound by the terms. 78 In a more recent case, the Second Circuit
held the user was bound by the terms in a mobile app for the Uber
ride share service by clicking a button on the payment page labeled
"register." The court held there was adequate notice and opportunity when there was a notice at the bottom of that same screen
that stated in readable print that "By creating an Uber account,
you agree to the terms of service and privacy policy." 79 On the
other hand, in Cullinane v. Uber Technologies, Inc., a different

court held that the notice of the terms on a slightly different Uber
ride-sharing mobile app were not sufficiently conspicuous to be
binding on the consumer. 80 While both cases involved Uber's mobile app, the outcomes differed due to the different design features
considered in each case. 81 In the Cullinanecase, the court noted
that the link to the terms and conditions (which contained an arbitration clause) were not particularly conspicuous and were not in
76 Meyer v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2017). See also
Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 918 F.3d 181, 187 (1st Cir. 2019) ("The reasonable notice
standard has governed online contracts across jurisdictions since the
early days of the internet, and the inquiry has always been context- and factspecific").
" Schnabel, supranote 60, at 120.
78 Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
79 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 79-80. (The words "terms of service" and "privacy policy" were hyperlinks to the text of those documents).
80 Cullinane v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2018).
81 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 80; Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62-64. (This illustrates how
quickly the design and features of mobile apps, as well as online websites, can
change, thus leading to potentially endless litigation regarding the sufficiency of
the notice and opportunity to review in situations where the business party and
contract drafter is trying to bind consumers to these linked terms).
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the characteristic blue color of most hyperlinks, and furthermore
the words noting that by creating an Uber account the user becomes obligated to the Terms and Conditions were smaller and in
print that did not contrast well with the background.

2

In the 2019

Second Circuit case of Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc., the court found
that an inconspicuous hyperlink to terms and conditions that was
included in an email after purchase did not provide the basis for
binding the consumer to the arbitration clause found within the
hyperlinked terms because the notice of terms was inadequate. 83
Thus, slight variations in how the notice of terms and opportunity
to review them are presented can make a big difference in the outcome.

Some critics have noted that online sellers do not really
want to encourage consumers to read the terms and conditions as
long as they can be upheld in court. Thus, many businesses use
hyperlinks featuring innocuous language such as "Legal" or "terms
and conditions," which does not signal the fact that the consumer
is entering a contract in the same way that a printed form contract
does. Also, the fact that the consumer is often required to step back
from concluding their transaction in order to link to one or more

lengthy documents before placing their order, is another way that
consumers are actively discouraged from reading the contract
terms. 84 Yet as shown in the above discussion of recent cases, there
have been a substantial number of cases in which consumer assent
is not found due to the inadequacies of the presentation of the notice of terms and the opportunity to review. Eventually, the companies engaging in online consumer transactions may well learn to
design their websites and mobile apps so that courts will be satisfied that the notice is adequate.
Providing clear and adequate notice of terms prior to consummating a contract is a valuable endeavor, of course. Nonetheless, it is not likely that the average consumer will ever actually
read the contested terms of online contracts prior to concluding the
transaction, regardless of how seemingly stellar the consumer interface design might be. As discussed previously, the consumer is
probably going to click on whatever is necessary to conclude the
transaction. At the same time, however, as pointed out by Karl
Llewellyn long before the age of Internet shopping and
82
83
84

Cullinane, supra note 80, at 62-64.
Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc., 913 F.3d 279, 292 (2d Cir. 2019).
See Kim, supra note 61, at 179.
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contracting, the consumer's signature or click on a button is a
"blanket assent" to the basic terms of the transaction, but not to
terms beyond their reasonable expectations or that undermine the
expected bargain.

V. WHY DEFENSES OF UNCONSCIONABILITY AND
DECEPTION ARE NOT SUFFICIENT

While the drafters of the proposed Restatement appear to
be satisfied that the availability of the defenses of unconscionability and deception will be sufficient to police any abusive clauses
that are "adopted" by consumers under the relaxed standard of assent set forth in Section 2, most consumer advocates who participated in this ALI Restatement project strongly disagreed. A cluster of reasons can be articulated for this position. First, once the
threshold of assent to the terms is met and the contract is deemed
binding on the consumer, the consumer is left with the burden of
litigating these defenses, which can be very off-putting for consumers affected by relatively small value transactions. Second, even if
the consumer does go to court to challenge one or more clauses in
an adhesion contract, the burden of proof for common law unconscionability is very high, and they are unlikely to succeed except in
the most egregious situations. In addition, the proposed Restatement adds a novel "salience" test to determine if terms are or are
not procedurally unconscionable, which may further complicate
the issue. Third, many of the standard terms contained in consumer adhesion contracts also include mandatory arbitration and
class action waivers. If the arbitration clause itself is binding, however, the consumer will not even be able to get to court to litigate
other potentially abusive or unreasonable clauses, but will be limited to arbitration, which has its own disadvantages for consumers.
The provision that consumers can void contract terms secured by
deception suffers from many of the same disadvantages that unconscionability does, i.e., this is an affirmative defense with consumers bearing a relatively high burden of proof. Thus, consumers
might be better off if they are not deemed to have assented to questionable clauses in the first place. Each of these reasons will be
considered in turn below.
The structure of the proposed Restatement basically presumes assent by the consumer to all the standard terms, provided
there is sufficient notice and opportunity to review, and a
568
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reasonable manifestation of assent.8 5 As discussed above, the Reporters readily agree that the assent involved is not informed, and
that consumers in these situations are neither expected to nor even
encouraged to read and understand the terms to which they are
presumably assenting. 86 Rather, the Reporters allude to a "blanket
assent" by consumers along the lines proposed by Karl Llewellyn,
to all the core terms with an expectation that the law will protect
them from overreaching by merchants or financial service provid-

ers. 87 Given this predicate, it hardly seems appropriate to saddle
consumers with litigating about unconscionable terms or deceptive
practices resulting in terms that they never agreed to nor reasonably expected. Most consumers do not have the time or the resources to hire an attorney and go to court for disputes that involve
relatively small amounts of money. 88 If the average consumer gets
stung financially by the operation of a standard term they "agreed"
to, most will just suffer the loss rather than trying to contest it in
court. Indeed, part of the rationale for statutory private rights of
action regarding unfair and deceptive trade practices under state
law, was to provide the consumer with access to better remedies
for marketplace injustices than had previously been available at
common law. 89 These state statutes attempt to assure consumer
access to the judicial system by providing a lower burden of proof,
attorneys' fees to the prevailing consumer plaintiff, and special
statutory damages. 90 Without these special provisions, and left to
their common law remedies, consumers would have been left without a viable remedy. The proposed Restatement effectively does
leave consumers without a viable remedy for the category of consumer cases that are not covered by the statutory protections.
In addition, even if consumers go to court with these defenses, the level of proof required is quite high. Both unconscionability and deception, as set forth in the proposed Restatement,
would be affirmative defenses and the consumer would have the
burden of proof. Thus, for practical reasons, if the merchant or
lender sues to collect based on an unconscionable term or has
85
86
87
88
89

TD, supranote 2, Section 2 of the Black Letter.
TD, supranote 2, Reporters' Introduction, at 1.

Id

See State AG Letter to ALI, supranote 31.
Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection:State and Pri-

vate Enforcement of UnfairandDeceptive Trade PracticesLaw, 81 ANTITRUST
L.J. 911, 917-919 (2017).
90 Id
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already charged the consumer something based on an unconscionable term, consumers may well not contest the charge. 91
The TD, like most state common law cases, requires proof
that the challenged term or practice be found both substantively
and procedurally unconscionable. Common law judges view substantive unconscionability as reserved for extreme cases, sometimes even requiring that they "shock the conscience" of the court.9 2
The California Supreme Court recently noted that the definition of
unconscionability under state law means the allegation must be
more than a bad bargain, but must be "overly harsh," "unduly oppressive," or "unreasonably favorable," which the court maintained, are different formulations that essentially mean the same
thing. 93 In a later case, the California Supreme Court elaborated
on the unconscionability doctrine, saying that "concerns about
freedom of contract, the importance of commerce, and continued
access to credit ... produce an understanding of unconscionability
that is inherently nuanced, such that few courts have ever declared
contracts unconscionable."94 The California court also noted that
"because unconscionability is a contract defense, the party asserting the defense bears the burden of proof." 95 The result of this high
burden is that very few consumers or others have succeeded in
overturning contracts or contract clauses based on common law
unconscionability. 96
91

Brady Williams, Unconscionabilityas a Sword: The Case for an Affirm-

ative Cause of Action, 107 CAL. L. REV. 2015, 2030-2031 (2019) (arguing the
consumer is even less likely to go to court to challenge unconscionable terms or
those based on deceptive practices if they are not sued, but wish to use these
doctrines as a sword to strike out clauses or void contracts, due to the expense
involved and the unlikelihood of success).
92 See, e.g., Belton v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1224
(Cal. App. 2007); Wayne v. Staples, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 466 (Cal. App. 2006);
De la Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 3d 1105 (N.D. Ca. 2014).
93 Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 353 P.3d 741, 749 (Cal. 2015).
94 De la Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 422 P.3d 1004, 1021 (Cal. 2018).
9s Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 748-49.
96 See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability'sSafety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 94 (2006) (finding that for all federal and state cases
involving unconscionability reported between January 1, 2004, and January 1,
2005, there were only thirty-three cases in which courts allowed unconscionability claims to proceed or even survive summary judgment. Furthermore, the
courts invalidated the contracts in only seven of these cases, while the courts in
eighteen of the cases limited the remedy by enforcing the contracts without the
offending provisions).
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There have been some rare cases in which the consumer has
prevailed on substantive unconscionability, but these are the exception rather than the rule. For instance, in a 2016 Delaware case,
James v. NationalFinance, the plaintiff was successful in challenging as unconscionable a short term consumer loan with an effective
interest rate of 835 %.97 To reach this conclusion, the court applied
a multi-factor test deemed necessary to overcome the general rule
that contracts are binding as written and that unconscionability "is
a concept that is used sparingly."9 8 In the end, the court voided the
$200 loan on the basis of common law unconscionability, but only
after an exhaustive analysis, concluding that "[n]o one would borrow rationally on the terms it [the loan] contemplated unless that
person was delusional, mistaken about its terms or a material fact,
or under economic duress." 99 Although in this case the consumer
was successful, it is unlikely that many consumers could duplicate
this burden of proof and expense.'
The TD's definition of substantive unconscionability as
"fundamentally unfair" or "unreasonably one-sided," may also be
relatively difficult to prove. Indeed, one of the comments to Section 5 of the TD states "a finding of substantive unconscionability
requires a degree of fundamental unfairness (or abusiveness) that
may be higher than the level of unfairness (or abusiveness) that
consumer protection statutes."' 0

'

supports some claims under ...

Furthermore, judges applying the common law, once they have
concluded that the consumer has "adopted" the terms of the standard form contract, will likely draw on the traditional law of uncon-

scionability for guidance. Thus there is a relatively high burden of
proof for consumers to reach.
As to procedural unconscionability, the black letter of the
TD says it must amount to "unfair surprise" or result from "the
absence of meaningful choice on the part of the consumer." On
this prong, there is both good news and bad news for the potential
consumer litigant. The good news is that the Reporters comments
J ames v. Nat'l Fin., LLC, 132 A.3d 799, 839 (Del. Ch. 2016).
98 Id at 814.
99 Id at 837.
10 Id at 839 (although the plaintiff did not receive any damages or attorney
fees as a result of the unconscionability claim, she succeeded on a related statutory claim under the federal Truth in Lending Act, under which she was
awarded a judgment of $3,237 plus attorneys' fees and costs. Without the TILA
claim, it seems unlikely that this consumer case could have proceeded).
101 TD, supra note 2, Section 5, Comment 5.
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and notes state that if a term is not "salient," i.e., not likely to affect
the contracting decisions of a substantial number of consumers,
then it meets the minimum requirement for procedural uncon-

scionability. They also state that the "great majority of standard
terms are not salient, and such nonsalience alone-without additional procedural flaws-ought to meet the minimum quantum
necessary for the procedural test."10 2 This seems to indicate that it
would be relatively easy to prove the procedural prong of unconscionability. The bad news is that, as many of the ALI commentators pointed out, the term "salience" is not one seen in existing case
law. Thus, a consumer arguing "nonsalience" would have to both
educate the judge as to its meaning and relevance, and prove that
the challenged term is not one that is likely to affect the marketplace contract decisions of a substantial number of consumers.
Another potential problem with the approach of the TD is
that many of the clauses adopted in standard term consumer contracts are mandatory arbitration clauses and class action waivers,
which have become quite prevalent in consumer contracts of all
types in recent decades." 3 The majority of these clauses, when
challenged, have been upheld against unconscionability claims
and arbitration has been compelled.0 4 With arbitration clauses,
there is an additional factor of potential federal preemption of state
law under the Federal Arbitration Act, which makes it even more
difficult for consumers to challenge an arbitration clause as

TD, supranote 2, Reporters' Notes, at 97.
103 See Scott Medintz, ForcedArbitration: A Clause for Concern, Consumer
102

Reports, CONSUMER REPORTS (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.consumerreports. org/mandatory-binding-arbitration/forced-arbitration-clause-for-concern/ (reporting that in over two-thirds of the most popular consumer product
categories, arbitration clauses are included in sales); Imre Stephen Szalai, The
Prevalenceof ConsumerArbitrationAgreements byAmerica's Top Companies,
52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 233, 238 (Feb. 2019), https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/online/vol52/52-online-Szalai.pdf (81 of the Fortune 100
companies included arbitration agreements in connection with consumer transactions, and 78 of those 81 companies also included class action waivers in their
arbitration agreements).
104 See generally Willy E. Rice, UnconscionableJudicialDisdainfor Unsophisticated Consumers and Employees' ContractualRights?-Legal and EmpiricalAnalyses of Courts'MandatoryArbitration Rulings and the Systematic
Erosion of Proceduraland Substantive UnconscionabilityDefenses Under the
FederalArbitrationAct, 1800-2015, 25 BOSTON U. PUB. INT. L.J. 143 (2016).
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unconscionable.0 5 Then, if the mandatory arbitration clause becomes effective, it tends to limit the ability of the consumer trying
to raise defenses against other clauses or to raise other claims in
court.

Unconscionability has proven to be an exceedingly difficult
argument to make to defeat mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. A good illustration of this is provided by Tompkins v. 23andMe, a Ninth Circuit case involving a consumer class
action contesting several contract provisions, including the mandatory arbitration clause, contained in a standard form contract
for the sale of individual DNA testing.' 06 The class wished to challenge the company's marketing claims that its service could be useful to consumers in detecting and managing genetic health risks, a
claim that was rejected by the federal Food and Drug Administration due to lack of prior approval.0 7 However, the consumers' attempt to make this claim in court was stymied by the mandatory
arbitration clause which the lower court had enforced by granting
the company's motion to compel arbitration. Even though the
lower court had conceded that the provision was procedurally unconscionable, the consumers failed to carry their burden of proof
on substantive unconscionability. Under applicable California
law, this doctrine is highly dependent on the context of the challenged clause, such as arbitration.
In 23andMe, the first aspect of the arbitration provision
considered as possibly unconscionable was a "prevailing party"
clause, under which the arbitration costs and reasonable attorneys'
fees of both parties would be borne by the party that ultimately
loses in the arbitration. On its face, this kind of provision would
appear to unduly burden the consumer party since there is always
a risk that a claim will be lost, and this provision significantly in-

creases the cost of losing by forcing the consumer to pay not only
their own costs but also those of the company.1 08 By contrast, most
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state unconscionability caselaw
prohibiting class action waivers if such is unduly unfavorable to arbitration. A
regulation proposed by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that would
have prohibited the use of class action waivers in arbitration clauses in consumer contracts was vetoed by Congress at the end of 2017).
106 Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th
Cir. 2016).
107 Id
at 1061.
108 See generallyJohn F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney
Fee Allocation: The Injured Person'sAccess to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567 (1993)
105

573

Loyola ConsumerLa w Review

[Vol1. 3 2:3

state UDAP laws, meant to support consumer access to court, pro-

vide for attorneys' fees to the prevailing consumer party only.' 0 9
As noted above, most consumers do not have the resources to pay
even their own litigation costs and thus may be discouraged from
even bringing a claim in the face of this type of clause. Nonetheless, in 23andMe, the Ninth Circuit stated that, based on several
California appellate court precedents, the clause was not unconscionable because it applied equally to both parties, thus obligating
the company to pay the costs of both sides if it lost the case."0 The
consumer's risk of losing in an arbitration may be higher than in a

normal case, however, because arbitrators have an incentive to favor their own repeat clients. "' If consumers do indeed lose their
arbitration cases more often than businesses do, then under the
challenged "prevailing party" clause in the 23andMe case, consumers would also more often end up paying the company's attorneys'
fees."

2

A forum selection clause providing for the arbitration to be
held in San Francisco, was also upheld against an unconscionability challenge in the 23andMe case. The court noted that "mere inconvenience or additional expense" is not the relevant test for substantive unconscionability, and that the consumers had not "met
their burden" of proving that the forum selection clause was unconscionable in that the named plaintiffs lived in or near San Fran-

cisco and had been given adequate notice in the contract that they
were agreeing to arbitrate in San Francisco." 3 Provisions exempting challenges involving intellectual property from arbitration, as

well as a provision limiting both sides to a one-year statute of limitations were also upheld because they applied equally to both
(Under the normal "American rule," in most civil cases, each party pays their
own attorneys' fees and costs, in the absence of an applicable "fee-shifting" statute or contract provision).
109 DEE PRIDGEN, RICHARD ALDERMAN & JOLINA CUARESMA, CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND THE LAW, Appendix 6A (Thomson Reuters 2019-2020).
110 Tompkins, supra note 106, at 1025.
"1 See Public Citizen Report: The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card
CompaniesEnsnare Consumers (2007), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/arbitrationtrap.pdf, (finding that of 19,000 cases, 94% of the decisions
were for the business).
112 Tompkins, supra note 106, at 1026. (California recognizes that some feeshifting in arbitration may be unconscionable, but under a California statute,
there must be a case by case determination of affordability for consumers).
113 Id at 1028-29.
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parties." 4 Finally, as to other claims of unconscionable contract
clauses, such as a unilateral contract modification clause, the court
said that such claims that do not challenge the validity of the arbitration clause itself, would be considered by the arbitrator.
Another more recent case from the First Circuit also rather
summarily rejected the consumer class plaintiff's attempt to challenge certain aspects of an arbitration clause as substantively unconscionable. In Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., a class of Lyft drivers sought
to challenge the company's practice of deeming the drivers to be
independent contractors rather than employees, but they were unable to get this heard in court due to the binding nature of the mandatory arbitration clause contained in a standard form contract."5
The Bekele case applied Massachusetts law to determine that an
arbitrationfee-splitting clause was not unconscionable because under the facts of this particular case, the company had agreed to pay
the arbitration fees for both parties." 6 In addition, the court held
that a unilateral modification clause was not substantively unconscionable under state law because it provided the consumer with
reasonable notice and an opportunity to accept or reject the modification."

Section 6 on Deception provides another affirmative defense for consumers who are deemed to have adopted certain
standard terms under the rules of Section 2. Unlike common law
fraud, this rule would not require a showing of an intent to deceive,
but it still places the burden of proof on the consumer to prove that
a deceptive act or practice resulted in the adoption of the term or
the contract.1 8 The Reporters' Notes state that one of the concerns
behind this section is "thata business would make a representation
designed to attract consumers and then undermine that

114

Id at 1030-33.

Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 918 F. 3d 181 (1st Cir. 2019). Although technically
this was a type of employment case rather than a consumer case, the drivers in
this situation "consume" their gigs as drivers subject to agreeing to a standard
term contract presented to them via a mobile app.
116 Id at 188-89.
Note that under this approach, a corporate defendant
faced with a serious unconscionability challenge to their arbitration clause, can
simply offer to pay the arbitration fees, while still leaving the provision in the
contract in such a way as to deter other potential plaintiffs who may not realize
that the company would waive the fee splitting when sued.
15

117

Id at 189-90.

118

TD, supra note 2, Section 6, Black Letter.
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representation in its standard terms."11 9 The Notes also state that
this Section incorporates doctrines developed by the Federal Trade
Commission and state unfair and deceptive acts and practices statutes. 20 This approach is a modest extension of the common law
doctrine of misrepresentation to void a contract or contract term
and could be useful to some consumers.' 2 ' However, the section as
articulated in the TD does not address deception by omission or
half-truth, or by imagery or visual elements, factors that are wellestablished in the FTC law of deception. 2 2 Also, as with unconscionability, the burden of proof is on the consumer to convince a
court to void a contract or contract term, even though the element
of assent to those terms is based on constructive notice.

VI. AN ALTERNATIVE

APPROACH TO ADOPTION OF

STANDARD TERMS

The Tentative Draft of the Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts is an impressive piece of work that has been years
in the making. The Reporters and other ALI participants are eminently qualified scholars and lawyers who appear to be trying to
"restate" the law of consumer contracts without considering the
possibility of improving and reforming the law in this important

area. However, as stated in the Introduction to this Article, the
ALI's mission has always included the possibility of restating the
law in such a way as to keep up with and be in tune with societal
developments. 2 3 As consumer contracts become increasingly
swamped with hidden online contract terms, it seems that the traditional contract premise that everyone who signs a contract has a
duty to read it has gone by the boards. Once the "duty to read" is
a dead letter, and the masquerade of consumer assent to these
terms is recognized as a legal fiction, then the presumption that
consumers are bound by all the terms in a contract, even those that
are unread and unexpected, must be adjusted. While it was

119

TD, supranote 2, Reporters Notes at 105.

120 Id
121

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 (AM. LAW INST.

1981).
122

See DEE PRIDGEN, JOLINA CUARESMA & RICHARD
M. ALDERMAN,

CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW, §§ 10:10 to 10:20, and §§ 11:16 to 11:21
(Thomson Reuters 2019-2020 ed.).
123 See Revesz, supra note 3.
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possible to have championed meaningful reform of the common
law of consumer contracts, the present draft of the proposed Restatement instead threatens to continue the outdated notion that
there is any semblance of "assent" to standard contract terms by
present day consumers participating in today's economy.

One way to break out of the fictive assent dilemma would
be to use wording in lieu of the TD Section 2(a) such as:
The consumer agrees to adopt the core transactional
terms of a consumer contract of which they are actually
aware, and the consumer also constructivelyagreesto the
conscionable terms to which they have signified assent
after receiving a reasonable notice and opportunity to review the terms and has manifested their assent. The consumer is not legally bound by any terms that are unconscionable or result from a deceptive act or practice or are
otherwise in violation of applicable law. The party seeking to enforce a non-core contract term has the burden of
proving that the terms are legal, and neither unconscionable nor based on a deceptive act or practice.
This wording has several advantages.

First this wording

acknowledges that the assent to the non-core terms of a consumer
contract is constructive, legally implied assent, and not any type of
actual assent. This wording reflects what both Karl Llewellyn and
the Restatement Reporters acknowledge is what consumers are actually agreeing to when they sign a standard form contract or click
on a button to complete an online transaction. This wording does
not bind consumers to unread terms merely because they had notice and an opportunity to review the terms but made the rational
choice to not read terms that are long, complex, incomprehensible
and non-negotiable. Under these circumstances, if businesses wish
to take advantage of the consumers' trust that by clicking "I agree"
they are binding themselves only to the core terms and that the law
will protect them from unconscionable, illegal or deception-induced terms, then these same businesses will have to bear the burden of proving that their terms meet certain criteria if they wish to

enforce them in court.
This approach allows the vast majority of standard form
contracts to be executed in a way that will facilitate the convenience and speed of most consumer transactions of today. It does
not require consumers to read and negotiate individual contracts.
Instead, it recognizes what most reasonable consumers are actually
577
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assenting to when they agree to standard form contracts. This approach fulfills the reasonable expectations of the consumer that
they can agree to contracts without danger of being taken advantage of by unscrupulous businesses who may be tempted to include a veritable smorgasbord of contract terms that are one-sidedly in favor of the businesses who write the contracts. If a
business needs to enforce a legitimate standard term in court, one
that is not unconscionable and is reasonably needed to protect its
interests, it should have no trouble doing so. This is a reasonable
compromise which, although it does change the current law to
some extent, it does not introduce any broad or potentially vague
concepts such as "reasonable expectations," but instead allows contracts to be formed and enforced as written, but with the standard
limitations of conscionability and non-deception built in to the
equation.

VII. CONCLUSION
ALI's Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts project is an ambitious and well- intentioned undertaking that has involved many years of hard work and many worthwhile contribu-

tions by a diverse set of ALI members and associates.
Unfortunately, it has been contentious from the start. From the
first meeting in 2012 to the 2019 ALI annual meeting, consumer

advocates have been voicing concerns about whether or not, and
on what basis, consumers should be bound by the standard terms
in contracts with which they are involved. Standard terms have
been prevalent in mass transaction contracts in printed form for

some time, but the length and complexity of such terms has only
increased with the rise of online transactions. Much of the discussion of the proposed restatement focused on such terms and how
to deal with them. Early on, the controversy at ALI centered on
whether the new restatement would simply restate common law as
applied to consumer contracts or try to improve upon it. The Reporters seem to have settled on restating or summarizing the existing law, even going so far as to provide an empirical summary of
decided cases on the critical issues, which itself was the subject of
criticism. The Reporters drafted a document that would bind consumers to all the terms of a contract of which they have had notice
and an opportunity to review, and to which they have manifested
assent. This relatively less demanding approach to the adoption of
terms was to be counterbalanced by the applicable defenses of
578
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unconscionability and deception. This "grand bargain" was criticized heavily, but the Reporters appear to have maintained a
steady course with little or no compromise. The culmination thus
far was a four-hour long discussion at the ALI annual meeting during which much was discussed, but only one section of the ninesection Tentative Draft was approved. The future of the proposed
Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts is currently up in
the air.

The common law of consumer contracts appears to rely on
the legal fiction of consumer assent to all the terms of which they
have had notice and an opportunity to review, regardless of the
fact that relatively few consumers ever read, much less understand, the lengthy and complex terms of their contracts to purchase goods, obtain credit, or subscribe to various consumer services. Historically, consumer assent to standard terms was
assumed because consumers had an opportunity to read the terms
and decline the contract if they did not like those terms. This is the
thrust of the so-called "duty to read" doctrine, i.e., that when one
signs a contract, one has a duty to read it or else risk being bound
by the terms as written. The proposed restatement, however,
acknowledges that consumers do not and should not be obliged to
read every word of every contract presented to them, but would
have the courts bind consumers to those terms of which they have
had a notice and opportunity to read, with the caveat that unfair
or deceptive terms could be struck down by the doctrines of unconscionability or deception. This is a type of "legal fiction," with
courts being asked to assume that consumers have assented to
terms, even though it is a known fact that most consumers have no
idea what terms are in their contracts beyond the core transactional details. Nonetheless, the Reporters do not acknowledge this
use of a legal fiction.
The doctrines of unconscionability and deception are well
known concepts in both common law and statutory consumer protection law. Yet as used in the proposed restatement, these doctrines would have to be used in court by consumers as defenses
against objectionable contract terms, putting an undue burden on
consumers. Most consumers cannot afford to litigate without class
actions, which are currently being suppressed by mandatory arbitration clauses and class action waivers. Also, there is a fairly
heavy burden of proof involved to prevail in striking contract

clauses as unconscionable or based on deception, even if the consumer does manage to go to court.
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Thus, it is this author's opinion that the draft Restatement
of the Law of Consumer Contracts, if adopted by the ALI, will not
be a step forward but instead will serve to solidify the existing legal
fiction that binds consumers to clauses they "agreed" to by virtue
of clicking "I agree" on their computer or tapping an icon on a mo-

bile phone screen, without ever being aware of all the terms and
conditions to which they are binding themselves. As discussed
above, there are quite rational reasons why consumers would manifest assent to unread contracts, one of which is an assumption that
the law will protect them from clauses that are unfair or deceptive.
Alas, such is not the case in the current law or in the draft Restatement. Others in this Symposium have proffered some ideas on how
to deal with this issue, such as terminating the project as impractical, changing it to a "Principles" project, or appointing an inde-

pendent task force to consider the issues. I suggest the use of some
alternative language in the black letter portion, that would
acknowledge the fact that the adoption of standard terms is a legal
fiction, or only "constructive" assent, and that the burden should
be placed on the drafter and enforcer of the questionable terms,
i.e., the business party, to prove that the terms at issue are conscionable and non-deceptive. In any event, it seems evident that at
this point, there is no consensus among ALI members on the proposed Restatement, a situation that should result in either a fresh
start, some major amendments, or simply abandoning the project.
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